

UNLEARNING



Claire Staebler Michael Buthe Lacaton & Vassal Walter Benjamin Walter Benjamin

Camille Henrot Camille Henrot Jason Dodge Lawrence Weiner Benoît Maire

Katarina Zdjelar Okwui Enwezor

Editorial Steine - Hommage für Ramon Llull The scenario as a program Museum of Modern Art MoMA made in China: interview by Nikita Choi Monkey mind **Contemporary Painting** Outside the frame Learn to read art Text and object: the real resides in each decision The perfect sound p.48 Reformulating the landscape of quick judgments

Credits / Colophon

p.49

p.52



Typologies of unlearning: RESISTANCE, RENEWAL AND FRESH ATTEMPTS

"Ignorance, inertia, but mostly the fear of having to give up vested interests keep us from sharing our knowledge." György Kepes

"You don't need to know something in order to teach it." Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster

For this first issue of the *Journal de la Triennale*, we have offered the hospitality of our pages to artists, architects and curators for their take on the notion of 'unlearning'. Their ten or so contributions, which range from a visual essay, through extracts from longer texts, a portfolio, and an interview, to poetry and discussions, have one recurrent question: "If it is necessary and legitimate at the beginning of any project to start with a blank slate, what form, in concrete terms, does unlearning take and what positions and strategies are required to achieve it?" Should destruction precede reconstruction or, as Irit Rogoff would have it, should one first slough off previously acquired knowledge as a prelude to absorbing the new, for fear, otherwise, of simply compounding information rather than rethinking the structure?

The opening contribution is a portfolio devoted to the work of German artist Michael Buthe. It is a selection of photos from the series *Steine - Hommage für Ramon Llull*. These pictures, which he retouched with paint, are typical of Buthe's constant interest in the juxtaposition and de-hierarchisation of his references and obsessions – subjects as diverse as his fascination with the East, mysticism, Arabic philosophy, cosmogony, literature and ordinary culture share an equal place with his own personal experience. When he was staying in Majorca at the beginning of the 1990s, Buthe invented an abstract alphabet, a language of stones in the middle of the island landscape, as a homage to the Majorcan theologian Ramon Llull, who, according to legend, was stoned to death.

Next is a piece devoted to the architects Anne Lacaton and Jean-Philippe Vassal which looks into their attitude towards learning and knowledge. They explain how movie techniques structure their view of architecture and how, contrary to all traditional architectural practice, montage and collage have become working methods.

The artistic heritage, and its assimilation into various kinds of copy, from parody to revisit, follows this. First an investigation in the company of Walter Benjamin of the concept "MoMA made in China", or how the carbon copy of a major 20th century exhibition invites us to rethink the concepts of author, original and masterpiece. Is the museum of the future, as WB suggests, a museum of copies? We then accompany Camille Henrot, who juxtaposes postcards of Tahitian women with outmoded portraits of the obsolete great names of painting, in a humorous condemnation of the way our society is riddled with these phantasmagorical stereotypes. In a second contribution, Camille Henrot assembles a selection of texts around the hoary old nature/ nurture dichotomy. The section closes with an interview with Jason Dodge, in which his work is reappraised in the light of his fascination for the domestic universe of Pierre Bonnard. In a new visual essay Text and object: the real resides in each decision, Benoît Maire lays the foundation for an open-ended reflection on the possibility of action and choice as the basis of our relationship to the real. If the object precedes thought, what becomes of the artwork?

Katarina Zdjelar's video leads us to consider another dimension of unlearning which, as Okwui Enwezor points out, cannot be contemplated with perfect innocence. Far from being a mere gesture of resistance or a poetic attitude, unlearning can also come in a more obscure form. It is surely reasonable to suggest that forced or organised acculturation is itself a form of unlearning.

If unlearning becomes a means of connecting with the world - an individual or collective tendency, allowing everyone to rethink, to renegotiate and to question what they believe or think they know – then art, inevitably, can help us reformulate our perceptions of the world.


















Interview with

— Anne Lacaton & Jean-Philippe Vassal

THE SCRIPT AS PROGRAMME

Claire Staebler: What does the idea of 'unlearning' convey to you?

Jean-Philippe Vassal: 'Unlearning' is an essential exercise, in that it forces you to become curious again, to operate from a position of doubt rather than one of certainty; invention rather than repetition. It's important for us to look at things in a new way for every project, with a child's eye, look at things naively, as if we had never been to Architectural School. You have to give rein to your emotions. At the same time 'unlearning' doesn't mean forgetting things, you don't have to lose the benefit of experience.

Anne Lacaton: 'Unlearning' also allows you to make a distinction between 'knowledge' and the 'acquisition of knowledge'. You can't cast doubt on the acquisition of knowledge, because it's taught as a key thing for our work. So, to unlearn means just remembering the foundations of knowledge, but stripped of the mechanical side and the automatism. I have the feeling that anything I've learned has been after I finished school. But maybe, unconsciously, I learned a lot at Architectural school.

JPV When we're standing in front of students, we always try to disorient them, at the same time as leaving them the freedom to do what they like. We don't dictate a site, or a model or a design, because quite often they've never had any freedom. We want to ask them why they want to be an architect. It could be that Wim Wenders is a better architect than me. These days, Anne and I are very interested in film and the tools of film. If architecture is a matter of imagining space around the movements of a person, we're moving away from traditional thought systems. Film is imaginary stuff created out of reality. People and places exist; most scenes are manufactured, then edited together to create the architecture.

AL What's important for us is to work out a project by building up an imagined set of spaces so that it brings us as close as possible to people's perceptions and what they feel. That seems to us to be a really interesting way of triggering thought about a specific space.


cs How does film act as a model to help you work out your ideas?

JPV Architecture is a series of spaces that get created according to the comings and goings of each person. Our work consists in making that series of spaces around the actors and the inhabitants of a building, or a district, or a town, the same way a film director makes his film by following the movements of his actor.

If a film director, for the purposes of his story, shoots a hotel bedroom in Berlin, a restaurant that he likes in Bangkok and a swimming pool on a roof in Los Angeles and gives the impression that the action is all going on in the same place, he creates an ideal imaginary space that could give us inspiration for designing a project.

AL In the process of architecture you often get the impression that space reveals itself once the shape of the project is built. It's essential for us to go in the opposite direction. For example; if we think of a street and the memory of it arouses a strong feeling of pleasure, its vegetal quality,... the light and the movement,... it's important to be able to decode all that so it can be incorporated into a project. This way of seeing things questions the basic things we learned. As a general rule, architecture teaches you to look at a site and to begin putting things on it. The cinema way of doing things means looking at fragments of space and adding them together; one piece of space leading to another, then another, and so on. As a strategy, it's a real sort of collage, or even, to use the vocabulary of film, a sort of editing. In the vocabulary of architecture, we regularly use the word 'programme'; the word we really ought to use is 'script'. When we build a space, we're writing the script as we go, and for every episode, for every second of the storyline, there's a corresponding space.

JPV And for every place there are potential storylines. It's not necessarily up to the architect to write them, but you have to think about the sort of habitat that would enable them to emerge. In quite a few of our house and apartment projects, we've seen how the inhabitants actually write the storylines better than us. It's magic. In the same way, it was fascinating



to see how the architecture of the Palais de Tokyo, when it was opened in 2002, soon gave way to the way it was occupied. The Palais de Tokyo was a hundred percent determined by the people who occupied it. The architecture of the place is not the empty building; it's the building full of artists, the users, and the staff. In one kind of way, the use they make of it with all their inventivity is more a product of the architecture than the building itself. Or in any case, the association of the two.

cs Generally speaking, for many of your projects, you use pre-existing givens as a point of departure for your programme. For the Palais de Tokyo, in a way, you had a double point of departure. In 2000, you started with an existing building then, for the second stage of renovation, you were working from layer upon layer of storylines. How does that affect the project? What are the implications of 'revisiting' a place?

AL As far as the Palais de Tokyo is concerned, we had anticipated that second phase when we did the basic work like restoring the building's stability

JPV What's interesting nowadays is the whole business of adaptation – starting with a precise reality and seeing how it can be transformed and changed; working out what has to be done in order to embellish or to improve existing things that are potential problem areas.

To a certain extent, our concepts of architecture and urbanism have been constructed on the idea of a *tabula rasa*. It's a widespread idea of the architect or the town-planner that when they design a town or a tower block, or a park or a road, they start with a blank sheet of paper. But in actual fact, the *tabula rasa* situation is becoming rarer and rarer, and it's far more usual nowadays to be designing something from a pre-existing context. As far as the Palais de Tokyo is concerned, we've approached it as a second temporary phase, a repeat initial state, which will allow for a 100% utilisation of the building. After the first phase of rehabilitation between

Palais de Tokyo / Credit: Lacaton & Vassal.

2000 and 2002, a third of the contemporary creation site was in use, even though the great strength of the building lies precisely in its verticality. Our point of reference now is Cedric Price's "Fun Palace" ¹. This project, though it was never built, combines the horizontal and the vertical to provide as much movement in one direction as in the other. So, after Djema El Fnaa, which had a more horizontal quality, the image we're trying to project is a dynamic of criss-crossing flow and movement.

cs And does the public 'unlearn' things through contact with your designs?

AL As a general rule, it seems important to us that people should learn or experience something. In the places we invent, we try to make it so that the users are forced to take a position, to have an attitude towards them. When the Palais de Tokyo first opened, it was interesting to see how a section of the public, with no experience of contemporary art, was attracted by this freedom that the place provides. The juxtaposition of these spontaneous visitors and the public of experienced gallery-goers caused people to begin to question certain attitudes, and the experienced visitors probably did unlearn a few things. In the same way, in our installation for Documenta 12, we wanted to give space to the artworks, in order to create spaces for exchanges, for visitors perhaps to talk about what they've just seen, to critique things or to see what other people think. The space, the fluidity and the extreme openness of the place can do something to change the way people interact.

cs In many of your projects for individual houses or social dwellings you pay particular attention to the possibility of increasing the surface areas of the spaces. The brief for the

Cédric Price, Fun Palace for Joan Littlewood, Stratford East, London, 1959 - 1961. An un-built project whose aim was to create a synthesis between avant-garde theatre and a leisure centre.


Site for Contemporary Creation specified that you should bring 5000m² within health and safety norms; you rehabilitated 8000 m². Is increasing the space available a sign of ultimate luxury for you?

AL The Palais de Tokyo is a special place in Paris and provides a certain luxury that visitors can wander around in, cut themselves off from the outside world and enter into a unique universe. It's a building where, sometimes, the sky appears then disappears, a building that offers up a very dense range of experiences.

It's a place that upsets spatial codes, providing a whole landscape with no apparent limits. You can keep walking without stopping. We're doing everything we can to keep these qualities. We've used the image of a public square before, in the spirit of the way Djema El Fnaa functions in Marrakesh. This is proving to be a very apt comparison. And when the great doors are eventually opened onto the front courtyard, people's perceptions of the building will change yet again.

JPV The public needs to be able to go as far as possible in the building, to tread on the earth and the tarmac on level zero and be able to see the Eiffel Tower from the terrace on level 3. In 2003, the Brazilian artist Rivane Neuenschwander ² installed a stepladder below a window to give people a new viewpoint from which to see the Eiffel Tower. It's

very important to vary the points of view. As a public space, the Palais de Tokyo is like a public square, where one person is looking at another person, who's looking at someone else, who's looking at an artist, who's looking at a work of art. That's five layers of people looking at things. If everyone is isolated from each other, it doesn't work.



Exhibition view *Superficial Resemblance* by Rivane Neuenschwander, Palais de Tokyo (Paris), 2003.

^{2. &}quot;Superficial Resemblance" solo exhibition

by Rivane Neuenschwander at the Palais de Tokyo (Paris),

²⁷ February-20 April 2003.



Museum of modern art

Once upon a time, far away in the East, there was a Great Nation proud of its rich culture and tradition which had flourished on this vast land for thousands of years. Being blessed with such a long history, people of this land lived through many rich and happy years. They witnessed times of ascent and prosperity, but also times of stagnation and decline. After one such long period of uncertainty and poverty, signs of change and optimism could be seen everywhere. The new culture was starting to emerge, while unusual forms of art were appearing in many places. In the beginning, this new art, named "contemporary," looked very strange since its origins were in the West and it didn't have much in common with the great masters from the past. Nevertheless, contemporary art was embraced by many young adventurous artists attracted to the ideas of individuality and originality. For a few decades this art flourished and could be seen in many new galleries that opened in all big cities of the land. However, after a while people started asking: "How could we have contemporary art at all without art history? What is contemporary art without the memory of modern art? Where are our museums of modern art? Wasn't it the modern art that invented the ideas of uniqueness and originality?"It is impossible to know what would have been the answers to these questions, if one day in the southern metropolis of the land known as the City of Flowers hadn't unexpectedly appeared a Museum of Modern Art. This was the most unusual museum, such that had never been seen before anywhere in the world. Indeed it had a magnificent collection of the most important works of modern art of all styles arranged according to the famous diagram, from Post-Impressionism, Fauvism, Cubism to Abstract art, Suprematism, Constructivism,... later DADA and Surrealism. As if all the masterpieces of

modern art had been by some magic taken from the West and brought to the East, and this Great Nation suddenly became the owner of the entire modern tradition. But it came as a huge surprise and disappointment for everybody when it was realized that in fact none of the exhibited works were originals! Instead, these were all copies made by the local artists from the City of Flowers. Some learned people

immediately began to complain: "What kind of modern art is this? These are all worthless copies. How we could have modern art without the originals? And we all know that the originals are in the great museum, far away in the West, called The Modern. That is the real museum of modern art, not this pathetic imitation!"What these wise men didn't understand was that they were looking into the past, and it was only in the past that the originals were admired and valued, while copes were despised and considered to be worthless. They could not see into the future, since in the future they would see that it is the copes that are valued and respected, while the originals are perceived to be simple and trivial. A copy of an original abstract painting will look just as abstract. But as a copy, this painting will also be realistic and representational. As time goes by, who knows how many new meanings that copy will acquire, how many new roles in how many different stories it is going to play. That is why our Museum of Modern Art made of copies is not a museum of the past, it is rather a museum of the future. Moreover, by being modern and non-modern at the same time, it will become the only true memory of modern art, the only true Museum of Modern Art in the entire world. This is how it happened that this Great Nation unexpectedly for the first time got not only its modern art, but at the same time the first museum of modern art.

From The Tales of the Artisans

Biography

Walter Benjamin is an art theoretician and philosopher who in *The work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* (1936) addressed issues of originality and reproduction. Many years after his tragic death (1940) he reappeared in public for the first time in 1986 with the lecture *Mondrian* '63 -'96 in Cankarjev dom in Ljubljana. Since then he also published several articles and gave a few interviews on museums and art history. His most recent appearance was a lecture *The Unmaking of Art* held at the Times Museum in Guangzhou 2011. In recent years Benjamin became closely associated with the Museum of American art in Berlin.



MoMA made in China

The Museum of American Art's collection, *Museum of Modern Art*, which was entirely produced in China, was part of the exhibition *A Museum That is Not*, that recently took place at the Times Museum in Guangzhou. On this occasion Nikita Choi, curator of the exhibition, had an interview with Walter Benjamin.

It is said that a Museum of Modern Art will show up in a museum in southern China in the near future and this very museum is a recreation of one founding exhibition in the history of modernism and it comprises only works of reproduction. We are all very curious about this upcoming event and had a chance to talk with Walter Benjamin, who had been a main proponent of reproduction and an observer of the museum's formation.

Nikita Choi: As you had been present in most of the events initiated by Museum of American Art and you have personally commented on the idea of copies as well as some of MoAA's collections and recreations, is it because these reproductions are somehow your *post-mortal* propagator or you are just part of it?

Walter Benjamin: I could see these collections and recreations as my, to use your words, post-mortal propagation. I also became a part of these events, since both copies and reincarnations of the characters from the art history are some kind of repetitions.

I have been associated with copy and copying for some time now. I wrote and gave lectures on this topic. Since the Museum of American Art in Berlin is entirely based on copies it was natural for me to become associated with this museum. Let me try to explain why I believe that copies today might become more important then the originals on the example of the Museum of Modern Art collection that is being

produced here in China.

As you know the Museum of American Art has been invited to participate at the exhibition A Museum That is Not at the Times Museum in Guangzhou. After some thought, we have decided to propose a collection named the Museum of Modern Art that will be produced locally. This collection is based on the historical exhibition Cubism and Abstract Art held at the Museum of Modern Art in New York 1936. On the cover of the exhibition catalog was a diagram describing the development of modern art in the first three decades of the 20th century. This diagram became the foundation of the History of Modern Art the way we know it today. The most important aspects of modern art are the ideas of individuality and originality. By recreating the Museum of Modern Art, not with the originals but with copies, we will not have



modern art but a *memory on modern art*. We will see what modern art was. And this could be important for the context of China, which as far as I know didn't have an experience of modern art in its past.

NC In China, we are very familiar with copies, which are part of our everyday life. Making copies are merely a way to make profits but not so much a violation of the author's autonomy. Although we use reproduction or recreation when talking about this Museum of Modern Art, but for most people, they are still just copies. What are the real differences?

WB The idea of originality was invented in the West and it is not older then a couple of centuries. It is primarily defined through painting as a unique and exceptional product called a work of art, made by a unique and exceptional person called an artist. In a way the idea of originality is an essence of modernity. However, throughout most of its history of

the West a notion of originality and artist as a unique individual was not known. A painter was just one among the craftsmen, just another kind of manufacturer not much different from a goldsmith or a cabinetmaker.

In a way it is the copy that gives the relevance to the original. Without being copied the original would be forgotten. But, paradoxically, the copy is a different painting; it carries another meaning from the original. This is why copy could define a story that is different from the art history.

I believe that the importance of the idea of the original art work and unique individual called the artist is over. This concept has produced a period in art we called Modernism but its potential is now exhausted. By remembering Modernism through copies, through this concept that is its antithesis, we are in fact placing ourselves outside of Modernism but at the same time we are not forgetting it. We are just establishing a position to re-contextualize it, to place ourselves outside of Modernism and the story called art history.



NC This Museum of Modern Art is one collection newly built by Museum of American Art for this temporary exhibition of A Museum That is Not. In one interview, you mentioned that "the theme of the Museum of American Art in Berlin is all about the 'invasion' of post-war Europe by American Art", what does this new collection have to do with the history of invasion and its original context, the so-called west, which includes America and Europe in general?

WB In the Museum of American Art in Berlin there is a small version of the Museum of Modern Art built of little copies of modern European art masterpieces. Although the subject matter of this little museum is only European art, as MoMA museum itself, it is exhibited as an American "invention". We are not looking here into individual works of art, but the series of works that are put into a story. In this case it is the story of European modern art told by an American, the first MoMA director Alfred Barr. This museum opens in New York 1929 but for many years it didn't include American art into its story since American modern art was perceived to be inferior to European. It is only after the WW2 and the emergence of the generation called Abstract Expressionists that MoMa start looking seriously into American modern art an decide to promote it in Europe. Between 1953 and 1959 MoMA,

through its International Program, organized a series of traveling exhibition shown in the major European cities. These traveling exhibitions of American modern art shown in Europe are the main story of the Museum of American Art in Berlin.

With this new collection we are going beyond the western context. This is now a story of original European modern art that was brought to American and put in the Museum WB The subject matter of this Museum of Modern Art is the Museum of Modern Art in New York from its early period, when its story was based on European modern art. In that sense this Museum of Modern Art is direct reflection on MoMA from the mid 1930es. On the other hand this Museum of Modern Art is an antithesis of all existing art museums. In a way it is a meta-museum. All art museums are based on two unique categories, the original and the



of Modern Art, and is now, after so many years, materializing in China not through the originals, but through copies. If Modern art didn't exist in China there could not be a memory about it. With this collection we will now have in China at least a memory on modern art. Buy materializing all the masterpieces of modern art, and exhibiting them together in one place, the way that have never seen before in China, we are opening a possibility that modern (European) art put in the story by Alfred Barr (an American), in this new interpretation based on copies becomes part of Chinese tradition. Since we do not believe in the importance of the idea of the original, having Museum of Modern Art recreated through copies and in China could be in fact the best expression of the spirit of our time. World of originals is the past, world of copies is the future.

NC Does this Museum of Modern Art have anything to do with any other museums of modern art in the world? Why this idea of recreate one in China?

artist. In our Museum of Modern Art we do not have originals and thus we do not have artists. It is not an art museum; it is museum about modern art. In this museum art is presented ethnographically. Through this museum we are looking into art from the outside, as a specific Western invention. Similarly as an anthropologist would observe a foreign culture trying to understand it, but does not belong to that culture. On the other hand by interpreting foreign culture we are in some way adopting it. By recreating this Museum of Modern Art we are showing how modern art could be interpreted and as a memory adopted in China. This might be one possibility how modern art could became a part of Chinese art tradition.

NC I understand this is not the first time of a complete reproduction of *Cubism and Abstract Art*, the famous 1936 exhibition of MoMA, originally this was part of *Sites of Modernity* which is now in the collection of Van Abbemuseum. But in the previous recreation, the copies are just 1/10 the size of the originals, so why the original size this time?



WB While in the case of the original painting there is only one size, a size of that single painting. But the in case of a copy the size could vary, in fact it is irrelevant. A copy can be the same size as the original, but it could be smaller or larger. This is possible since the copy is a symbol representing the original, while the original represents only itself. When we have a certain symbol then its size is not important. For example, a cross as a symbol of Christianity could be small or large but its meaning will be the same. In the case of the small Museum of Modern Art exhibited in Berlin, the size of copies is 1/10 of the originals, while here we have 1:1 copies. In both cases a little copy, lets say of "Dance" by Matisse, will have the same meaning and play the same role as the large 1:1 copy. The only change is the relative size of the observer. While observing the Museum of Modern Art in Berlin we are looking at museum from above like giants, we could not enter and observe it from inside. Here in case of 1:1 museum we will be able to enter it and experience this entire collection from inside. I think that would be very interesting experience since, as far as I know, the sight of these icons of the 20th century modern as a full scale paintings exhibited together was never before experienced in this part of the world.

NC I also heard that MoMA's first director Alfred Barr is one of the authors of this collection, how do you think of his work? What is your relationship with him?

wb We are very good colleagues and we have friendly and productive relationship. I am more a theoretical person and Alfred is more a practical museum person interested in exhibitions. As you know we both died a long time ago, but this was in the story called the art history in which, as far as I remember, we never met. Now we are alive again playing in another story that is still being written. We don't know yet what kind of a story this will be, but as I mentioned above, it is definitely a meta-story in relation to art history. In this

new story we not only know each other but we closely collaborate in the projects related to the Museum of American Art in Berlin.

NC Instead of histories, narratives are created. You also said that "In fact, this work contains its own context, its own narrative, so that you don't need additional clues if you known modern art history". This modern art history seems to be the key to start a new reading, what about those who are uninformed of this history?

WB You are absolutely right, in order to move outside of art history you first have to know it, in a way you have to digest it. It is art

history that gives the meaning to the works it incorporates. Within art history an abstract painting by Mondrian is a work of art. But for someone who is coming from a completely different culture, who doesn't know anything about this Western story called art history, the painting of Mondrian is just a piece of canvas painted with bright colors. This would be one way to be outside of art history, by not knowing anything about it. Another possibility is to learn about art history and become its believer. In that case you will recognize and admire this painting by Mondrian because you will know its meaning and importance in the art history.. There is a third possibility, to learn art history but not being its believer (follower). In that case you will recognize this painting by Mondrian as an example of abstract art, but you would not admire it as a believer, you will just understand that some people who believe in art and art history admire this painting. Basically, you have to know art history in order to be able to overcome it.

NC For some people, these paintings are not even reproductions. They are productions without originals. These works may be the only visual connections with the never-exited originals, for those who have never been able to step into a so-call genuine museum. Sometimes you desire something stronger because you've never seen it, is this what you expect?

wb I would agree with you. Sometimes an open "lay" can bring us to the places where no truth can. This is why, for example, people have invented the theatre. In the theatre you could see a "murder" in a way you could not in reality. In the case of this Museum of Modern Art we will have a visual spectacle of masterpieces of modern art that would be very difficult to assemble anywhere in the world with originals. This is another example of the values of copy. We could create any story we could imagine with copies. For the

experience that visitors will have it is irrelevant if these are copies or originals. Even in some very prestigious museums today originals are secretly substituted with copies in order to protect the original, so the visitors are looking at a reproduction thinking it is the original. In our case it is all transparent, visitors would know these are not originals, but what does it matter? As you said these paintings will give an experience of previously not seen images, brought together as a spectacle. And we think this approach is an example for the future. By the way, the distinction between the original and copy exists only within art history. There are many cultures that do no make this distinction. Even in pre-modern Europe this distinction didn't exist.

NC If it is about the future, how do you envision the future of this Museum of Modern Art?

WB This Museum of Modern Art is not only about China, it is also about the West. Conceptually, being based on copies and not on originals, it is already outside of the existing Western story even when it is exhibited in the West (Germany, Holland). This outside position in relation to the West will be more emphasized now when the Museum of Modern Art becomes materialized physically outside of the West. In a way it might have one kind of effect in China and another in the West. I think for the West it would be very important now to be able to experience an echo of its own culture as something foreign, something strange. In other words, West have to be able see itself from the outside.

For this Museum of Modern Art it is not only important that it is produced in China but, I think, this is where it naturally should belong. It might help in establishing an example how it would be possible to move beyond the story called the

art history without forgetting it. I also think that it would be important for the West to see and experience this Museum of Modern Art made in China. It might help them to see their own culture in a different way and to understand how they could move beyond the art history. Perhaps this new story, this meta-art history will become the common story in which both China and the West would feel at home. This story is just beginning to be written.

Museum of Modern Art, installation view at the Times Museum, Guangzhou 2011 / Collection of the Museum of American Art, Berlin.



photos: Man Ray

Camille Henrot



Monkey mind

Too much intelligence takes us away from what is obvious, from ordinary, banal things –in other words essential things. Amongst other things, banality is the way things first strike us –perception. So, obviously, it is knowledge that proceeds from the senses, and that we have to remember. To do so, is a matter of unlearning acquired knowledge that acts as a barrier between ourselves and our experience – one of the meanings of my quotation from Lieh-tzu "He thus attained that state in which nothing in the natural order was obscure to him." ¹

If one is to gain access to one type of knowledge, is it necessary to have forgotten another? It seems necessary, when one considers the question, to move away from traditional ideas of nature and culture. We need to reconsider sensualist thought, where the idea of unlearning predominates and to redefine instinct as an intention outside language that can evolve and change, and does not stand still. This is the thinking in Robert Ardrey's text about the planarian: "There are different degrees even of instinct." ²

To experience things outside previously acquired experience, to be able to regain access to an openness that enables one to forget what Powys called "that coursing anxiety" 3, is one of the ways to construct a personal philosophy, a "philosophy of solitude" that calls on what he terms imaginative reason, a reason that admits sensuality and aspiration and the transcendence of human understanding.

This does not mean that the human world is one of irrationality, but that one must "perceive transcendence as transcendence, speak of it not according to the meaning of the words inherent in the given language but by a, perhaps difficult, effort to use words in order to express, beyond meaning, our mute contact with things that have not yet

become things said."4

This effort to detach oneself from the meaning of words inherent in language is reminiscent of the work that the psycho-analyst generally suggests: to unlearn one's mother tongue, as Lacan proposes, in order to gain access to one's own truth, and to reconstruct by means of a new language – that of oneself and one's analysis (la-la language). ⁵

Perhaps one should speak a foreign language — without mastering it — so that one's mistakes would be understood as a respect for this complexity, which presents itself in the first place as a sensation, and which is made up of ambiguities too subtle for language not to adulterate.

Although it is generally recognized that "language is fascist" ⁶ and that one needs to be aware of the violence of words, the taxonomy that language reflects, the way it segments reality, the destruction of the essence of things that it inflicts upon us, it is not a reason to give up speaking. It is perhaps the mismatch of words and reality that gives literature and any creative form of discourse their raison d'être.

Using words in their different senses and signifiers, and also making them travel from one language to another, is the way we can destroy the "authority of language", or rather keep it in perspective. For Barthes, literature differs from specialized knowledge in that it brings together different domains and relates them to one another — (the example Barthes gives in *How to Live Together* is Robinson Crusoe, a work which is an ecology text book, a treatise on architecture, hunting, psychology, and various kinds of knowledge brought to bear on one another, all at the same time). ⁷ The imagination then is the alternative to and the finality of language — to speak no more — from Lieh-tzu, a means

^{1.} AC Graham, *The Book of Lieh-tzu*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

^{2.} Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative*, New York: Atheneum, 1966.

^{3.} John Cowper Powys, *The meaning of culture*, W.W. Norton & company, inc, New York, 1929.

^{4.} Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968.

^{5.} Jacques Lacan, The Fonction of Speech and Language

in Psychoanalysis, W.W. Norton and Company, 1966.

^{6.} Roland Barthes, Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France, le 7 janvier 1977.

Roland Barthes, How to live together, Inaugural lecture at Collège de France, January 7 1977.

of affecting reality without harming it "in which one sees that subjectivity pushed to the limit, can lead to more objectivity." 8

And this is one of the great pleasures of reading – to sense that intuitive things have been brought closer and redistributed: "Language is fascist, but literature is a force for freedom". This is surely why texts that evoke the "unsayable" are so beautiful: Jean-Christophe Bailly talking about the "phreatic table of what can be sensed" 9, Bataille's "lost intimacy" or John Cowper Powys's "ichthyosaurus-ego, (...) the distant, vegetal-reptilian-saurian hinterland of the human soul."

Because the value of objectivity has been overestimated, it needs to be avoided, considered counter-productive; "only that which is not pushed to the extreme has no return effect." ¹⁰ Unlearning is needed in order to forget the hierarchy that gives pride of place to what is objective in knowledge – i.e. science – and devalues what smacks of subjectivity and freedom in knowledge – i.e. literature, art, poetry. No doubt such an enterprise will require one to begin by parading the traditional dichotomies of nature/nurture; object/subject; animal/human. It will be a long process of unlearning (dis-apprenticeship)... which is also an ethical questioning, formulated perfectly by Levi-Strauss:

"Never more than in the last two centuries of his history, has man been better able to understand that by arrogating to himself the right to separate humanity from animality, ascribing to the one what he refuses to the other, he was opening a cursed circle, and that that same barrier, constantly pushed back would serve to alienate men from other men, and to claim for ever smaller minorities the privilege of a humanism that is corrupt from the outset for having taken its principle and its very concept from pride." ¹¹



Yona Friedman, L'ordre compliqué et autres fragments, Éditions de L'éclat, Paris, 2008.

* "The unicorn's order seems to be disorder. It is a complex order. The pure, virginal unicorn has no grammar. Its thoughts are difficult to apprehend but the unicorn embodies perfect, spontaneous order."


Yona Friedman

^{8.} Vincent Debaene L'Adieu au voyage. L'ethnologie française entre science et littérature, Paris: Gallimard, «Bibliothèque des sciences humaines», 2010.

^{9.} Jean Christophe Bailly, *The Animal Side*, Fordham University Press, 2011.

^{10.} AC.Graham, *The Book of Lieh-tzu*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

^{11.} Claude Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology* (Vol. 2) 1958 trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, 1963.



Yona Friedman, *L'ordre compliqué et autres fragments*, Éditions de L'éclat, Paris, 2008.

* "Humans have become too intelligent to understand anything of the world"

15th district of Paris saying. Yona Friedman

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD

its outline, so careful in its controls, so haunting in its implications that it bears inspection here. This was a study made by Jay Boyd Best and Irvin Rubinstein at the Walter Reed Army Institute in Washington.

The planarian worm is a small marine creature found, for example, in the bayous of Louisiana. He has no true central nervous system, but simply a pair of nerves running down his back, an arrangement fashionable half a billion years ago. What evolved as a brain in later ages consists in the planarian of nothing but a pair of enlarged ganglia furnishing connectives between the two nerves. The ganglia provide a semblance of a head sufficient to indicate which end of him is which, but it cannot be very important, for if you cut him in two he will grow a new head at the front of the old back section. Also, he has no circulatory system, and his origins go back so far as to antedate common biological developments in plumbing; he has no rectum, and rids himself of waste through special pores in his skin. So far as sex is concerned, the world of the planarian worm offers limited entertainment. He is capable on occasion of laying an egg, although normally he reproduces himself by division. Nature presented this creature to our ancient swamps somewhat before she completed her experiments with sex. It was a long time ago.

Now, it stretches imagination to the breaking point if we attribute to a creature lacking brain, blood, sex, and even rectum any elaborate emotional or intellectual life, or any notable capacity for nostalgia. And yet Best and Rubinstein in the course of their tests of the planarian's capacity to learn came up with hard evidence concerning his capacity to remember. He "prefers" to eat in places where he has been before, although what he prefers or remembers with, I cannot say.

The experiment was as simple as it was conclusive. The worms were kept in glass bowls. A batch, to ensure a hearty appetite, was allowed to fast for three days. It was then divided into two groups. One group of worms, to be familiarized, was placed in a plastic receptacle without food for an hour and a half, then returned to its home bowl to go on being hungry for another half-hour. In this interval the receptacle was scoured

THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE

and rinsed with hot water to remove any traces of spoor or identifiable remains. Now both groups, equally hungry, were placed in feeding receptacles with a proper dinner of chopped liver floating in water. One group had never been in its receptacle before; the other, of course, had had its ninety minutes of residence but because of the scouring was presented with no clues—odors, tastes, landmarks—by which the receptacle could be identified. Nevertheless, the worms of prior residence began eating on the average in twenty minutes, while the worms encountering their receptacle for the first time took forty-two. And when the experiment was repeated with fresh batches of worms denied food for six long days, the results were precisely the same: those familiar with the dish took just half as long to start eating as those who had never been there before.

It is common knowledge that a dog enjoys eating in a customary place, and that many higher animals will eat better where they feel familiar. This is normally interpreted as anxiety and caution in a strange place, confidence and security in an accustomed one. But here we are dealing neither with long custom nor higher animals. What is the confidence that a planarian worm derives from a ninety-minute exposure to a plastic dish? And how does he know that he has been there before? And beyond all that, just what does he have to know with or feel confident with, beyond two bumps on his symmetrical nerves?

There are ghosts in evolution's attic. A shutter slams on a windless night. There is a scraping sound above our heads, and with a considerable palpitation we move about our room, inspect the ceiling. The sound stops. A single step on the stairs outside gives a soft creak; then there is silence. We rush out the door. There is no one. Who was it? Where did he go?

door. There is no one. Who was it? Where did he go? Man is as invested by the unknown but measurable forces of the natural world as is the planarian worm. We are as haunted by old voices, as driven by old dictations, as contained by old and sometimes inappropriate regulations as is the cricket near his niche. And while it may seem an unlikely leap to fling ourselves from plastic dishes and numbered fish bowls to the modern farm, I believe that we shall recognize on its familiar

110

109

Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative*, New York: Atheneum, 1966.

CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY

fact, responsible for there being a universe at all or a consciousness to contemplate that universe. Even if the consciousness were its own God and a secret-sharer, beyond conception, in the magic that builds the world, it would still be aware, however extravagant its pride, of levels of creative energy totally beyond its reach. Such levels would represent the ultimate mystery I am referring to, this remote 'Unmoved First-mover.' Whether this unknown be regarded as one or many, as conscious or unconscious, the psyche retains a place for it among her normal feelings that it alone can fill.

And it would appear that in the lovely-ghastly world, which, in the fatality of our nature, we are all of us half-creating and half-discovering, it is a grim relief and a stoical comfort to concentrate our mind upon this unknown, the fountain, whether consciously or unconsciously of all responsibility.

It would indeed seem that all deep culture must supply itself with some constantly recurrent substitute for what traditionally is known as prayer; and, for the philosophic mind, nothing can serve this purpose but a lonely, wordless, one-sided dialogue with the mystery of mysteries. When one further enquires, in this dim region of intellectual being, what kind of emotions they will be with which this naked and stripped consciousness contemplates this ultimate, the answer is: with intense gratitude and intense defiance! Thus alone, in this way and in no other way, can the feelings excited by the subjective-objective spectacle of life,

THE MEANING OF CULTURE

in all its appalling contrasts, find their apogee of satisfaction.

We are aware of aspects of our world which are too hideous to dwell upon, which can only be borne, so to speak, by being daily forgotten. Under the burden of having to forget these cosmogonic atrocities, the naked and lonely psyche satisfies her nature by a secret protest. In the solitariness of her dialogue with the Infinite she hesitates not 'to return to It its ticket.' On the other hand to what else, finally and instinctively, can the ego look, when in the sudden overbrimming of its cup of happiness, it desires to offer up its unutterable thanks? Thus the dilemma of the self's secret dialogue with that which lies behind its world must remain for ever unresolved; divided between the horn of its everlasting gratitude and the horn of its everlasting defiance.

But it matters not so much what the emotional content may be of the psyche's dialogue with the final mystery; what matters is that in the depths of a person's culture there should be some sort of grim, stark, bed-rock philosophizing. It is this basic grimness and starkness that gives to any worthy culture the iron it needs, the formidableness it needs, if it is going to remain undazzled by the brutally glittering surface, undeafened by the brazen voices.

That tender compromise called resignation is only an eloquent name for the dying down, the wearing thin, of the vital impulse in us. It is just here that it would seem of the utmost importance, for occidental

26

CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY

minds, to shake off the sad, self-satisfied metaphysic of the Orient where such weary resignation, patronizingly contemptuous of what it regards as the mad illusions of youth, prides itself on its irrefurable wisdom. Far nearer to Nature's secret would seem to be an attempt to get the two spontaneous reactions, of gratitude to Life and of defiance of Life, fused in some way in our solitary contemplations. Thus a return would be initiated to that Homeric simplicity of response, where what is called philosophy cannot be separated from what is called poetry; where the instinctive life-impulse, brimming up from the fathomless reservoirs of Nature, is not poisoned at its source by the tricky perversities of logic; and where finally that stoical imagination which springs from the deepest levels of our being utters the last word.

It is most salutary for our personal culture when, in these 'dialogues with mystery,' we are compelled to recognize the one-sided and unsatisfactory nature of every rational explanation of the world-riddle. It is just here that the uncultured but educated man finds himself irritated, bewildered, nonplussed, by the sophisticated childishness which exists in the heart of true culture. For it would appear that no scepticism has gone far enough till it has reached the point where almost any magical interpretation of the universe seems truer than almost any scientific one. The permanent mental attitude which the sensitive intelligence derives from philosophy is an attitude that combines extreme

THE MEANING OF CULTURE

reverence with limitless scepticism; and the result of this is that the temper of true culture will be found to be much more akin to the immemorial superstitions of the human race than to the dogmatic arrogance of the last mechanistic theory.

To sum up the argument once more: since the conscious development of our awareness of existence is the very essence of culture, it is necessary to acquire the habit of falling back in our thoughts upon the basic human situation. This situation must be realized in such a way as to be utterly unshakable by any kind of rational doubt. To assure ourselves that no doubt an touch it and that when we sink down upon it we are at the unassailable heart of things, it is necessary to clear our mind of every preconception, whether philosophical or religious. Thus in our lonely communion with the cause of our being there will be no place for optimism or for pessimism. Our personality will simply strip itself bare and will commune with this ultimate power in a concentrated, if one-sided, dialogue. It will feel both gratitude and indignation; not only for itself but for all other sentiencies that are aware of happiness and of unhappiness. Such will be the same whether it had lived through a thousand incarnations and were destined for as many more, or whether it had been brought to birth out of non-existence and were destined at death to return whence it came. The next rung, so to speak, in the philosophical ladder, is the recognition by the psyche of its own

27

38 / THE VISIBLE AND THE INVISIBLE

minations of the same thing, we transfer this certitude to the interior, we resort to the fiction of a "little man in the man," and in this way we come to think that to reflect on perception is, the perceived thing and the perception remaining what they were, to disclose the true subject that inhabits and has always inhabited them. But in fact I should say that there was there a thing perceived and an openness upon this thing which the reflection has neutralized and transformed into perception-reflected-on and thing-perceived-within-a-perception-reflected-on. And that the functioning of reflection, like the functioning of the exploring body, makes use of powers obscure to me, spans the cycle of duration that separates the brute perception from the reflective examination, and during this time maintains the permanence of the perceived and the permanence of the perception under the gaze of the mind only because my mental inspection and my attitudes of mind prolong the "I can" of my sensorial and corporal exploration. To found the latter on the former, and the defacto perception on the essence of perception such as it appears to reflection, is to forget the reflection itself as a distinct act of recovery. In other words, we are catching sight of the necessity of another operation besides the conversion to reflection, more fundamental than it, of a sort of hyper-reflection (sur-reflexion) that would also take itself and the changes it introduces into the spectacle into account. It accordingly would not lose sight of the brute thing and the brute perception and would not finally efface them, would not cut the organic bonds between the perception and the thing perceived with a hypothesis of inexistence. On the contrary, it would set itself the task of thinking about them, of reflecting on the transcendence of the world as transcendence, speaking of it not according to the law of the word-meanings inherent in the given language, but with a perhaps difficult effort that uses the significations of words to express, beyon

Reflection and Interrogation / 39


instead of surveying it, it must descend toward it such as it is instead of working its way back up toward a prior possibility of thinking it—which would impose upon the world in advance the conditions for our control over it. It must question the world, it must enter into the forest of references that our interrogation arouses in it, it must make it say, finally, what in its silence it means to say.... We know neither what exactly is this order and this concordance of the world to which we thus entrust ourselves, nor therefore what the enterprise will result in, nor even if it is really possible. But the choice is between it and a dogmatism of reflection concerning which we know only too well where it goes, since with it philosophy concludes the moment it begins and, for this very reason, does not make us comprehend our own obscurity.

A philosophy of reflection, as methodic doubt and as a reduction of the openness upon the world to "spiritual acts," to intrinsic relations between the idea and its ideate, is thrice untrue to what it means to elucidate: untrue to the visible world, to him who sees it, and to his relations with the other "visionaries." To say that perception is and has always been an "inspection of the mind" is to define it not by what it gives us, but by what in it withstands the hypothesis of non-existence; it is to identify from the first the positive with a negation of negation; it is to require of the innocent the proof of his non-culpability, and to reduce in advance our contact with Being to the discursive operations with which we defend ourselves against illusion, to reduce the true to the credible, the real to the probable. It has often been pointed out "that even the most credible imagination, the most conformable to the context of experience, does not bring us one step closer to "reality" and is immediately ascribed by us to the imaginary—and that conversely an even absolutely unexpected and unforeseeable noise is from the first perceived as real, however weak be its links with the context. This simple fact imposes upon us the idea that with the "real" and the "imaginary" we are dealing with two "orders," two "stages," or two "theaters"—that of space and that of phantasms—which are set up within us before the acts of discrimination (which intervene only in the equivocal cases), and in which what we live comes to settle of

15. EDITOR: In particular by Sartre, L'Imagination. [English translation by Forrest Williams, Imagination: A Psychological Critique (Ann Arbor, 1962).]

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The visible and the Invisible*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968.






























OUTSIDE THE FRAME

Claire Staebler: Jason, when I invited you to make a contribution concerning the concept of "unlearning" you told me about your interest in the paintings of Pierre Bonnard and Félix Valloton. So what did you learn from them? 'What in this context do you find of interest in their work?'

Jason Dodge: Naturally, I have known of Bonnard and Valloton's work for most of my life, But until recently, I didn't really look at it, I thought of their work as other peoples work, other peoples interests. What I realized and started to see that I related to deeply was a recognition of a familiar intimacy, a focus on a feeling, a sense of being present and somehow allowing paint to be also present in the recollection, or act of that particular moment. It is a time for me in my life of feeling extremely close to my wife and children, and a connection to other generations far gone as well, but the intense focus to look at Christine, look at my children, this is the kinship I noticed in Bonnard's attempt to push bits of color through Marthe as he felt her by seeing. A feeling I have found in other places too, there is an amazing Jean Valentine poem, "Outside the frame" she writes... "... Look back in on the children/ the regular neutral flicker of

their blood: pale, solemn/ long legged animal gods in their sleep./ growing into their lives, in their sleep.

cs Which works by Bonnard interested you in particular?

JD There is a painting I saw at the glypotek in Copenhagen the other day, there is a boy hiding behind an exterior door 1, it is summer. two women are focusing all of their attention on a dog, but the only thing you can see of the dog is a tiny bit of snout, and a tiny bit of ear.

There is an intense but passive love in that picture, I find it truly moving. His paintings of Marthe in close domestic situations also really move me -- He was a social man, loved his family and friends, when Marthe, a misanthrope withdrew them to the countryside there is a sense of imprisonment and fascination -- love and fear, I guess the self portrait as a boxer reveals this from the other side of the picture. I always think, or i forget that it is not, when I am looking at a picture by Bonnard, that his paintings must have been facing the subject and not him

cs You have said that your work is not autobiographical, yet you include a lot of personal allusions. Are you trying to create an ambiguity? Are the characters fictional?

JD When ever I use names in my own work, they are simply what I say, the weaver, the chimney sweeper, the sleeper, the bell maker etc. I have though, started to work with my ancestors names, making portraits of them. But no, I am not interested in fiction.



^{1.} Pierre Bonnard, *The Dining room*, 1925, The Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek, Copenhagen.

cs In which ways will you develop these ideas?

JD The portraits are made by removing something. The absence is what is present when someone dies, or when you remember them, or when you hear a story. I don't really know how to handle talking about it, the stories are quite personal, there is tragedy in my family, I know how generations absorb things, and inherit trauma, sadness, loss. The blindness that happens over 20, 50, 70 years has so much potential to define, but also gives something to reflect.

cs The fact that one introduces parts of one's intimate life, one's personal history in an exhibition in a public space does that also speak to the position of the viewer as *voyeur*?

JD In the case of Bonnard there exists a correspondence between what he saw and what he allowed the viewer to see. The space between both is very interesting. He was exploring this space in his paintings by using color and form to make a presentation, to create meaning. And it is interesting to look at how different kinds of meaning can be revealed. Sometimes it emerges by using fragments of history or biography or a specific subject, and sometimes meaning is simply communicated through form and representation. I am very interested in the idea of meaning as being equivalent to seeing, as something that can be perceived through the imagination rather than through the information that you get by looking at something or through the intellectual effort of understanding. William Carlos Williams said, "A poem is a small (or large) machine made of words."

Matthew Zapruder also refers to it in his poem "Come all you Ghosts." when he writes "behind this machine/ anyone with a mind /who cares can enter." You must be willing to enter any work of art to use it, and even if you can't see the parts of it, they can still be doing something.

The idea of seeing as a process of feeling or to see by thinking, means that often the work itself will be overlooked, and in fact it is going to be only seen by someone who actively chooses to see it. Mostly, the people, the figures, are the part that is missing in

what I make. I tell you about them but they are not there. It is like using the feeling of missing someone as a material.

cs Regarding this aspect of your work which a viewer can easily overlook, there appears to be a discrepancy between that which one sees at first glance and that which the work actually communicates. Ultimately one could say that what you see is not what you think you see.

JD It is no different than most things really, we don't know what most things are by looking at them, we also don't know where they have been, or what is in them or who has touched them - as we don't know who is heartbroken, who is carrying a weapon, how much electricity, who wore that, what country are the inhabitants connected to through that satellite dish. As the world is this, I think it is an interesting way to approach artwork.



Jason Dodge, Katherine Bissell Dodge, A radiator removed from a room, 2011.



LEARN TO READ ART



Text and Object: the Real resides in each Decision

In his reading of 's work, Frédéric Worms observes that saying what one has seen is a twofold impossibility¹. This ordinary operation — seeing and saying what one has seen — lies at the very basis

of "s philosophy as a differend between two regimes of exchange, one of which relates to the saying (discourse and writing) and the other to the seeing (image and figure). These two poles/positions establish, within

the author's (*i.e.*, 's) philosophy, a concordance in which the impossible disrupts the real and informs the heteronomy of sign games. With the artistic manifestations we are accustomed to seeing, and to hearing about... this differend, at the root of a series of disjunctures establishing the postmodern condition, operates and produces the potential contours of the meaning (*vouloir-dire*) of curators. By seeking to reconcile that which cannot be reconciled — the saying and the seeing, which we

, Sens & Tonka, 2008, p.20.

¹ Frédéric Worms in Les Transformateurs

can replace (in our more materialist and less phenomenological present context) by 'text and object²', what is brought into sharp relief here is the use of and. The 'and', which creates a disjuncture between text on the one hand and object on the other, is underscored by us insofar as it is the caesural operation, the motive for the differend, which opposes the possibility of a reconciliatory dialectic. The dialectic that turns two into One is tied to the copula, to the collage which performs associations. An exhibition may make a lasting attempt at collage — the movement of bringing together object and text — yet the essential discordance between the two displays, before our very eyes, this impossible copula as the production of non-unified, open and slightly bleeding meaning, like a skinned calf in a Rembrandt painting.

An exhibition would therefore be: the reconciliation of the saying and the seeing in a form which is precarious because impossible, momentary because non-absolute, and authorial because non-objective. Yet we all do come to experience it, for it is indeed a fine spectacle, not to say a tragedy,

atmosphere with remains phenomenological, using the background of givenness / constitution as relationship to the real (which is always an intentional reality). Here, a disjuncture, with the text on the one hand and the object on the other, enables us to take this work into another context, the object will therefore designate everything that is not a sign, it will be that which is outside of all texts. The debate about the possibility of such a delimitation reveals various philosophical positions whose characteristics we sketch out in oily chalk in these few paragraphs

before returning, in the conclusion, using a 2B pencil, to a re-evaluation of disjuncture as conveying a potential within a context which is no longer really his.

² The saying and the seeing may create a disjuncture between two regimes of exchange, yet the

each time repeated, opened up and unresolved. On this basis several strategies emerge, which set out to turn the 'and' (et) into an 'is' (est), i.e., the operator of disjuncture into a dialectical operation. I am reminded of three cases here, the first of which is the text which accompanied the "The Waves" exhibition held in Nantes in 2010 and whose catalogue was the book by Virginia Woolf, which was simply stamped with the list of artists and the exhibition's date and location — here the text is autonomous and

anterior to the . The second case I am reminded of dates back further: it is the "Grey Flags" text written by one of the artists participating in the exhibition and which served as a press release — here, the text is synchronous, but adjacent to the object. Then there are research texts which prepare and announce manifestations, often large-scale, foregoing projects — the text therefore anticipates on the object. These three cases or modalities of the text-object relationship — autonomy and anteriority; synchronousness and asideness; and anticipation — are still tied to and determined by the signifying intention of the curator.

The signifying intention... the notion might appear as vaporous and vague as the morning fog, yet it has been given a central place in the classical deconstruction of logocentric thought. Through a critique of the function of *Bedeutung* (meaning, signifying intention), Jacques Derrida, in his famous reading of Husserl's philosophy, made the text autonomous from the object and provided the reflexive field with another kind of sign. Contemporary artistic manifestations still use this deconstructed sign to

make the text autonomous from and anterior to the object. In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida reflects the sign and notes that it can be divided into the two aspects of expression and indication, which Husserl distinguishes from one another on a conceptual level but interconnects in the actual use of signification. Derrida works on disassociating them, noting that the ideal content is always that of the *Bedeutung* side, thus that which is not tied to the outside, contrary to the indicative function of the sign which guarantees content its connectedness. Derrida's conclusion is a radicalisation of Husserl's doubt as to the existence of an outside — in his words: "By a strange paradox, meaning would isolate the concentrated purity of its ex-pressiveness just at that moment when the relation to a certain outside is suspended"3. If it may be observed that Derrida lays a basis for thinking the autonomy of the sign, which will give writing a foundational import ("there is nothing outside the text"), we need to specify the current position vis-à-vis the concept of the real, which remains one of philosophy's major names for the outside.

At first glance Husserl's thought seems to designate a certain kind of realism which seeks to achieve, in philosophy, a 'return to things themselves'. Yet the same of things — therefore the concept of the real as attached to things themselves, or 'in themselves' — is displaced by the creative readings of phenomenology. Derrida may have deconstructed any remaining presence in the text's relation to the object and shifted the line

³

³ Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena and Other essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p.22

Graham Harman has provided another reading, which shifts this dividing line once more and opposes Derrida by distributing the real onto things in themselves, independently from the human signs produced (writing no longer has a foundational function and I would say that, by extension, neither does the writer). To oversimplify things, we might say that if, for Derrida, the real is the text and, for Harman, it is the object, these antinomical positions nevertheless come together to state the possibility of their disjuncture. Therefore, according to this basic equation, the transformation of the 'and' in 'text and object' into an 'is' remains a fundamental issue of the most contemporary realism. In his attempt to reconcile these two positions through the terms 'thought' and 'the absolute', Quentin Meillassoux steps up a level in the predication of the terms I am using here, and reconfigures yet again the field of play.

This realism debate then provides the sign with another stake which could be thematised as the meaningless sign and the nature-text. I will pursue the commentary when these paths become more distinct (which resembles football commentary in its inability to step back from the acts which make up philosophical actuality); but now I would like to give a notion of a reconciliatory position regarding the real, which may not be valid (it is my reading and I am not yet a realist and therefore I sign) but which allows us

to sketch out the portrait of the so-called "logician" philosopher, Alain Badiou, as a 19th century existentialist.

Badiou may indeed be presented as a genius metaphysician who uses mathematics to formalise being, but various readings have led me to a few notions which, without corrupting this initial image, refine the existentialist backdrop supporting its construction. Is this a signifying intention or a meaning (*vouloir-dire*, a 'wanting-to-say')? I would call it a 'savoir-vivre', rather. In *Theory of the Subject* Badiou starts to imagine a concept of reality bound to the subject by decision.



Here, synthesises Kierkegaard and Lacan

in a kind of inaugural rough draft. In the two other books presenting his system, this intuition is radicalised, geometricised and refined, yet the initial intuition is always present, *i.e.*, the Lacanian never-stopping-not-writing the real which entails that truth is an exception to the forms of the 'there is' and engagement in Kierkegaard's choice ground Badiou's ethics of fidelity to a point as a specific relationship to the event.


This idea that the real relies on choice places ethics in a foundational position, like writing for Derrida or the existence of the object for

's initial question persists: there are speculative realism. But objets and there are texts, but what can be said of their relationship beyond its disjunctiveness? Saying what we have seen without corrupting the real requires a novel idiom, a language which is always (always-already) new, i.e., inexistent. In such a way that to speak, to bear witness, is always to learn to speak by placing oneself outside of language, i.e., speaking another language, a foreign language which has established itself empirically. Surely the resolution of such a paradox, where learning is an unlearning, lies in a successful work, i.e., simply in a work? A work which presents itself to us as something pertaining to a set of rules and which at the same time exists outside of them? What I recognise as a work (insofar as it is a work, a single work, a unified 'art object' therefore, rather than a thing) is indeed an exception, a creation, an exception created as a passage into existence. Does this not make it real, autonomous and foundational? As the product of a choice, it is an exclusion. The work may take on the structural form of the testimony and place itself outside of other works by establishing its own kind of language, yet it is also constructed locally, or

perhaps we should say 'point by point'. 's position thus presents itself as a philosophy which engages the possibility of a work without prescribing its form. This opening, this informal prescription, or let us say this "invitation", appears to us as the condition of the real as such, and

touches on the possibility of the work of art in a sense we now need to start explicating.

The logical sense of this text is to deliver an overview of the text-object



and-seen by other subjects, but which produces an object as real as a

billion year-old stone. In this sense, the question would be how a realist

aesthetic would be possible. To return to some of exception; i.e., that of testimony, we will recall that its form is one of exception: considering a set of accepted rules, the testimony will always need to exclude itself from them to not corrupt the real, the real as a novelty, as


structure of a testimony, since it stems from the same scandal) leads to the production of an object as real as a planet for it is as identical to itself. Yet the speculative paradox of this work stems from the fact that self-identity, this sameness which makes it a single object, can also at the same time be functionally replaced by any other work, *i.e.*, the object is also pure metonymy. The work of art, insofar as it informs the real (in the sense that the informing stems from the fact that it participates in the real) is identical and metonymical, and I will therefore argue this mad idea regarding the artistic function: that identity <u>is</u> metonymy. But I entrust the validity of this synthesis to whomever might wish to twist it, for the reconciliation of Badiou's conceptions of the real by promoting a philosophy of creation

such as 's in a realist environment, is worth more than a piece of cheese, no doubt.

Benoît Maire, October 2011, Paris.

This text will appear, revised and updated, and in German translation, in the journal "Geschichte der Geometrie", published as part of Benoît Maire's exhibition 'History of Geometry", showing from April 2 to May 15, 2011 at the Halle für Kunst, Lüneburg, Germany.















The Perfect Sound, 2009, video, 14'30".



REFORMULATING THE LANDSCAPE OF QUICK JUDGMENTS





Okwui Enwezor: It's a very important structure that you have set up for this edition of the journal. And the proposal to use the model of unlearning as a point of entry into what I consider to be a very difficult subject, namely the relationship between cultural, historical, and intellectual positions in a context of conflict and misunderstanding. In order to come to terms with the intersection of these positions, especially in the context of la Triennale, *Intense Proximity*, my point of reference is to begin with clearing the deck, rather than beginning with a pre-existing model of categorical knowledge of the other, a legacy of how we have formerly regarded these relationships.

So this question of unlearning is not so much to create a sense of ambivalence towards the tension that marks the conflicts between the positions, but to create a sense of intellectual skepticism concerning the forms of categorical knowledge of these cultural, intellectual, historical, and philosophical positions. Furthermore, I think that our point of departure, which could be called ethnographic poetics, shows how artists in today's world of culture are using techniques from various disciplines to illuminate the resurrection of historical knowledge.

If we are going to make this exhibition a source of speculation, we mustn't work with pre-existing categorical



Guy Tillim, Mount Mouaroa, Moorea, 2010, diptych, 112 × 148 cm (each).

knowledge, but with a sense of ambivalence toward any kind of systematized understanding of the different cultural spheres. So unlearning also enables us to critique our own curatorial position. It is not only the position of the audience or other interlocutors but our own curatorial position that has to be made a little unstable in order for us to be able to deal more powerfully with the issues that we are exploring. The precarious nature of our own curatorial position should be part of what we are doing in order to forego any kind of deterministic approach and to really use the exhibition as a foundation for speculation.

cs Leaving aside the context of the Triennale and that of art in general, isn't the attempt to unlearn a manifestation of resistance, an act of disobedience?

OE We may ask ourselves, on a superficial level, what does it mean to be visible or invisible? I think for me unlearning starts with the question of what I would call the politics of invisibility and the politics of disappearance, where the subject is visible but is not seen.

The subject is visible because we have formed opinions about the character and the nature of the subject, the cultural coherence of the subject's political strategy such as are often indicated by authorities with regards to immigrants. The political and cultural elites will say, "the problem with

immigrants is they are not integrated enough." But no one asks what it means for the immigrant to forego his or her previous historical coordinates, that is to unlearn their own cultural formations. So all the determinations have already been made in a kind of "a priori" way and unlearning really enables us to step back, to actually make this move of stepping back from the categorical or deterministic approach, to give ground in order to judge more clearly. It's a way to step back from quick judgment, quick conclusion, a way to make unstable the basis of our own powerful views. Therefore for me, this is in a sense an act of resistance, when you step back you're giving ground but you're also repositioning the space between two vectors of power.

If you look at the work of Jean-Luc Moulène "Les filles d'Amsterdam": on the surface it may immediately be seen as a kind of a voyeuristic work, but it also prompts us to resist that kind of quick judgment "it's pornographic, it's exploitative, it's this and that." It forces us to give ground and allows the possibility for a new zone of reflection, on why we really have to unlearn the immediate view that it is pornographic. Of course, on the surface evidence of women exposing their vaginas to the camera, the judgment will lead us towards the view of the pornographic content of the image. However, putting aside that instinct that regarding a particular subject, invariably leads to hasty judgment and premature conclusion, will reposition the way we approach the work. By stepping back we inject more complexity into the exchange.

These forms of disobedience, what I want to call the dimension of critical disobedience in the work of art gives us new techniques, new forms, new fields, new articulations, new research methods and philosophical propositions that for me are very important because art is about constantly reshaping and reformulating the landscape of quick judgments.

cs Coming back to the project *Intense Proximity*, how does the exploration of the poetics of ethnography allow us to think about some of the issues raised by contemporary art?

OE I think to deal with the poetics of ethnography we also have to unlearn the notion that ethnography is necessarily "bad", that it manifests only an instance of the hierarchy of power. It's true on one hand that ethnography injects forms of power relations into the field, but on the other hand we also need to engage with the question of what ethnographic knowledge has produced and how can we recalibrate that knowledge in terms of responses that artists are making to that particular body of knowledge and how artists are in a sense also 'unworking', 'unbuilding' the characteristics of ethnographic poetics. Lothar Baumgarten takes this

initiative in a kind of persistent return to the field in order to dislocate the categorical block in which ethnography is from time to time placed. So if we begin with the landscape of our exhibition one can say that it represents a field of some thoughts that we need to sort out. On one hand we are curating that field but on the other hand we are also deconstructing it. We are curating it by using the space of Palais de Tokyo that presents a field of diverse artistic and intellectual propositions. These are not categorical propositions and coming together with the audience is one way to create different deviations from what viewers might immediately see as how one will look at particular places. Thomas Struth goes off to photograph the "virgin jungle" in China, Brazil, Japan, Peru, etc., but it's ironic because as you are looking at the photopraphs you begin to notice that it is not virgin anymore because he is there already, marking the paradise with his presence. So something has already happened and he forces us to rethink what we mean by virgin forest. Every ethnographic encounter leads to a loss of innocence. So we confront viewers constantly with these kinds of artists.

Each time we start a conversation we need to step back from the forms of categorical information and address the forms of totalizing judgment that we have brought to the process of curating. What does it mean to be a native or a foreigner? That for me lies at the heart of the question of unlearning. Who is a foreigner and who is a native? Julia Kristeva has written powerfully about this. We cannot have this categorization of foreigners and natives in which the foreigner would seem to be assimilated into the culture yet the native who doesn't want this assimilation, doesn't want this integration, will simply resist it. So we have to really unlearn how we deal with these categories.

cs This leads us to another dimension of unlearning where it is forced or constrained by cultural, social or political determinisms...

OE Yes, and these questions are powerfully projected in the field of culture and ideas. The dark side of unlearning is quite important, when the process of acculturation in a certain way is a process of giving up something in order to address something or gain something else. To enter a new culture you necessarily have to either mask, hide, and/or relinquish your own values in order to be accepted. Acculturation has a dimension of negation. That dimension of negation refers precisely to a negative side of unlearning, namely the unlearning of the positive side of beginning afresh and to think with an open mind, but also to consider the unlearning of those violent aspects of one's constitution. How do you become a good Muslim or a bad Muslim? The dialectic between the good and the bad Muslim, what does it



Guy Tillim, Aakapa, Nuku Hiva, 2011, 112 × 148cm.

mean? It's a political stance rather than a religious one. How can you be accepted? You shaved your beard! You uncovered your hair! You have to undo something. So unlearning also repurposes violence in the name of acceptance.

cs Intense Proximity intrinsically expresses the current paradox of what you call 'intimate globalization'. Does the process of globalization compel us today to unlearn or relearn a certain number of things?

OE The paradox is that globalization unbuilds the old borders of modern totalization, the Nation State, the artificial borders set up between territories and so on. It is because globalization unbuilds and begins to create what I call a disturbing nearness that "Intense Proximity" fascinates me. So how do we distinguish between shallow distance where you have a space to yourself and disturbing nearness where you feel that you're being crushed by something that you find unacceptable? That is the paradox of globalization. When you look at Levi-Strauss's photographs of the face painting of the Caduveo women, particularly the drawing on the face of one woman which is really like a world map, however behind this mask is a confrontation with her eyes the immediacy of which creates that sense of intimacy and disturbing nearness which suffocates and reduces distance. So we are really in the face of a force of negation that speaks of something already changing at that moment 80 years ago when Levi-Strauss was in Northern Brazil.

But that is something that was already reflected in the poem of William Carlos Williams entitled "To Elsie" or "The pure product of America/go crazy." For me that poem encapsulates what I was trying to convey about this sense of intimacy. Williams wrote this poem about his Native American housekeeper. It looks at how intimacy has produced something, which is catastrophic indeed - the catastrophy of intimacy. It's again like Thomas Struth photographing the virgin forest although he knows it is not virgin, or Guy Tillim on following Captain James Cook's path to the South Pacific only to find on his arrival that the

paradise had disappeared. So all of these different moments of intimacy with nature, culture, and societies facing extinction deepen the dimensions of our ecological imagination. When intimacy is experienced as shallow distance or disturbing nearness, the borders have collapsed. Intense proximity occurs when all of these parameters completely collapse and we are forced to confront and to unlearn our behavior because we are no longer in absolute control of the mechanisms of knowledge upon which we had come to rely to make sense of the world. So intense proximity actually begins the collapse of modern totalization.



Colophon

Le Journal de la Triennale # 1

January 2012

Publisher

Centre national des arts plastiques (CNAP)

Artistic Production Director

Marc Sanchez

Editorial Director

Claire Staebler

As part of La Triennale, *Intense Proximit*y, 2012, **Artistic director** Okwui Enwezor **Associate curators** Mélanie Bouteloup,

Abdellah Karroum, Émilie Renard, Claire Staebler

Contributed to this issue

Walter Benjamin, Michael Buthe, Nikita Choi, Jason Dodge, Okwui Enwezor, Camille Henrot, Anne Lacaton, Benoît Maire, Jean-Philippe Vassal, Lawrence Weiner, Katarina Zdjelar

Translation and proofreading

Jeremy Harrison, Uta Hoffmann, Sibylle Roquebert, Aude Tincelin

Graphic design g.u.i

La Triennale, 2012

Intense Proximity
Palais de Tokyo
and
Bétonsalon

Musée Galliera

Crédac

Instants Chavirés

Les Laboratoires d'Aubervilliers

Musée du Louvre

From April 20th through August 26, 2012

Culture Communication





La Triennale is organized at the initiative of the ministère de la Culture et de la Communication / Direction générale de la création artistique, commissioner, by the Centre national des arts plastiques (CNAP), associate commissioner, and the Palais de Tokyo, producer.

CREDITS

Michael Buthe

Steine - Hommage für Ramon Llull, 1991-1992

— Steine (13, 63, 84, 85, 86, 89, 90) // p. 3, 4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9 //
All images: acrylic on photograph // Photo: 'german photographer' //
©Estate of Michael Buthe, courtesy Alexander and Bonin, New York

Anne Lacaton & Jean-Philippe Vassal credits: Agence Lacaton & Vassal // Exhibition view— "Superficial Resemblance" // p.11 /Rivane Neuenschwander, Palais de Tokyo (Paris), 2003 // photo: Marc Domage

Walter Benjamin

Museum of Modern Art, installation view at the Times Museum, Guangzhou 2011 // p. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 // Collection of the Museum of American Art // photos: Man Ray

Camille Henrot, courtesy the Artist p. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35

Jason Dodge, courtesy the Artist

p. 36, 37

Lawrence Weiner, courtesy the Artist

p. 38

Benoît Maire, courtesy the Artist p. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47

Katarina Zdjelar, courtesy the Artist

p. 48

Okwui Enwezor: Guy Tillim

Mount Mouaroa, Moorea, 2010 // Diptych / p. 49 / courtesy the Artist
and Stevenson Gallery, Cap Town

Aakapa, Nuku Hiva, 2011 // p. 51 / courtesy the Artist and Stevenson Gallery, Cap Town

Front page:

Museum of Modern Art, view of the exhibition at the Times Museum, Guangzhou, 2011, collection of the Museum of American Art, Berlin